Lentäjät alkoivat riidellä – matkustaja­kone putosi minuuteissa kilometri­tolkulla

[Öyhö]

Aika tunari tuo perämies. Jos se olisi ajoittanut hyökkäyksen loppuliukuun, niin olisi siellä jihadistien taivaassa elikkäs kuolliut.

Nyt tuomitaan Arabiemiraateissa? "Kiva" kohtalo, paitsi jos Mossad ehtii ensin

[rikkalapio]

Tarina vain kehittyy

[zzrgg]

FlyDubain lentoa FZ1073 koskevia kommentteja on kuultu myös Al-Qaidalta. Hiljattain heinäkuussa 2026 toimintansa aloittaneen arabiankielisen Al-Bayan -viikkojulkaisun 11. numeron pääkirjoitus käsitteli Flydubai-lentoyhtiön lennon FZ1073 kaappausyritystä nähden sen olevan osa suoraa jatkumoa syyskuun 11. päivän tapahtumille, ja kehotti tekemään vastaavia iskuja yhdysvaltalaisia ​​ja israelilaisia ​​lentoyhtiöitä vastaan. Al-Bayan -nimisiä julkaisuja, aikakauslehtiä ja julkaisusarjoja on useita (kuten vaikkapa dubailainen sanomalehti), mutta tätä kyseessä olevaa Arabian niemimaan al-Qaidan (AQAP) kannattajien joka perjantai julkaisemaa propagandalehteä jaellaan erinäisissä Telegram-kanavissa, ja julkaisut ovat näkyvillä vain lyhyen aikaa - tämä kyseinenkin vain vajaa pari vuorokautta, jos edes sitäkään.

Al-Bayan -viikkojulkaisun taustalla on Al-Yaqin Media, joka on osa al-Qaidan mediaekosysteemiä al-Qaidan virallisen mediahaaran, As-Sahabin, rinnalla. Al-Bayan -viikkojulkaisujen laajuus on vaihdellut noin 9-20 sivun välillä.

Kirjoituksessa tehdään suora rinnastus syyskuun 11. päivän iskujen ja Flydubain tapauksen välille, ja nämä molemmat terrori-iskut esitetään osana jihadistisen narratiivin jatkumoa, joka ulottuu Irakin al-Zarqawista aina nykyhetkiin asti kattaen myös viimeaikaiset Gazan tapahtumat. Pääkirjoituksessa ei oteta operatiivista vastuuta lennon FZ1073 tapahtumista - Hamam al-Hammamia ei mainita tekstissä lainkaan nimeltä, mikä olisi melko varmasti tehty, jos kyseessä olisi tyypillinen vastuunotto terroriteon jälkeen. Pääkirjoitus on pikemminkin kannustava, toimintaan kehottava ja värväämiseen pyrkivä viesti, jossa FZ1073:n tapausta, kuten myös Yhdysvaltojen joukkojen vetäytymistä Irakista, käytetään osoituksena länsimaiden haavoittuvuudesta ja heikkouden tilasta.

Al-Bayan -viikkojulkaisun pääkirjoitus "Between 11 September and 30 September" julkaistiin kolmipalstaisena tekstinä, ja teemoittain se jakautuu karkeasti alun narratiiviseen osaan, välivaiheen legalistiseen ja teologiseen pohdiskeluun ja huipentuu lopulta uhkauksiin, lupauksien antamiseen ja toimintaan kehottaviin sanoihin - aina "siihen asti kunnes allah saattaa valonsa täydelliseksi ja korottaa sanansa maan päällä". Kyseessä on eskalaation ja radikalisoitumisen klassinen ketju: lukija vedetään ensin mukaan kertomukseen, sitten lukijalle annetaan lupa toimia, ja tämän jälkeen hänelle kerrotaan, että teon olisi itse asiassa myös syytä tapahtua, ja että lopulta näin kyllä myös tulee tapahtumaan.

AQAP:n toiminnan kannalta keskeisin uusi piirre on tämän propagandapamfletin keskivaiheilla esitetty ei-uskovia toimijoita käsittelevä kohta, joka on merkittävä uusi linjaus operatiivisessa mielessä: terroristin ei tarvitse olla uskova, eikä hänen intentioillaankaan ole mitään väliä; riittää, että hän suorittaa teon, joka heikentää vihollista. Tuo teko "hyödyttää islamia" riippumatta siitä, kuka sen teki tai miksi - kyseessä on siis puhtaan utilitaristinen laskelma, jota yritetään oikeuttaa uskonnollisilla teksteillä ja käsityksillä. Al-Qaidan perusteluissa keskeisen osan saa eräs hadith, joka toimii tekstissä teologisena liimana ja ankkurina, joka yhdistää tekstin kolme osaa toisiinsa, ja jolla pyritään antamaan koko argumentaatioketjulle teologista ja profeetallista oikeutusta. Alla tuo pääkirjoitus englanniksi käännettynä AI-välihuomioiden kera:

Al-Bayan_terror_conv.jpg (213.44 KiB) Katsottu 323 kertaa

(I) palsta:
Telling a Story
Part 1 | **Narrative / hagiography** | 9/11 ↔ FZ1073 parallel; "Zionist-UAE" neologism; Zarqawi as savior

Between September 11 and September 30

Iraq: September 2026 (kuva Yhdysvaltojen sotilaslentokoneesta evakuoimassa sotilaita Irakista)
America: September 2001 (kuva 9/11 lentokonetapahtumista)
Saudi Arabia: September 2026 (kuva kaapatusta lentokonesta: FlyDubai FZ1073 Tabukissa)

There are dates that do not simply pass by on the calendar like ordinary days; they remain etched in the memory of nations; it is as if time itself pauses at them, then returns to ask: "What has changed since that day?"

On September 11 — a quarter of a century ago — the atmosphere in America early that morning was heavy with an impending calamity — one poised to strike, alter the course of history, and throw the world into turmoil. The disaster struck on their own soil; their prestige crumbled alongside the collapse of the Twin Towers and the impact on the front section of the U.S. Department of Defense.

The world's arch-criminals went into a frenzy and waged a fierce war with Iraq serving as one of its battlegrounds. There, they were met by the lions of Sunni Islam — figures such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abu Anas al-Shami, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir [who is] the Al-Qaeda in Iraq [AQI] Minister of War, alongside with thousands of Sunni heroes: scholars, commanders and soldiers — who wrote the most glorious epics in the Land between the Two Rivers — chronicles inscribed with their own blood [..recorded by history in their own blood].

Today, in that same month (September 30, 2026) — a quarter of a century after the catalyst for the global war against Islam (September 11, 2001) — the same scene repeats itself, unfolding in the very same manner, but this time in the heart of the Islamic world: an attempt to hijack a Zionist-Emirati plane carrying dozens of Zionists. It nearly triggered an event that could have upended the balance of power among the region's enemies. [And] at the same time, the U.S. Department of Defense announced its humiliating withdrawal from Iraq, having failed — praise be to god — to achieve its goal of breaking the spine [might] of Islam.

1. Sacred-calendar framing (Sayyid Qutb lineage)

• The opening is a sacred-history move: 9/11 and 30 September 2026 are not ordinary dates but divine pivots around which time "pauses." This is Qutb's Jahiliyya historiography made literary — history is not linear but cyclical, organized around God's turning points. The "quarter century" (ربع قرن) creates a liturgical rhythm that positions the reader inside a sacred cycle, not a political one.

2. Binary world / "World War Against Islam"

• The entire post-9/11 conflict is reframed as their war against Islam (الحرب العالمية ضد الإسلام), not a response to terrorism. "The greatest criminals in the world" (أكابر المجرمين) is a dehumanizing collective label. This is the Qutb/Azzam binary: the world is in Jahiliyya, and the only real history is the clash between Islam and the Crusader-Zionist axis.

3. Hagiography of the Iraqi insurgency

• The naming of al-Zarqawi, al-Shami, al-Baghdadi, and al-Muhajir as "lions" (أسود) who "wrote the most glorious epics" (أروع الملاحم) recorded "in their blood" is a direct continuation of the Azzam → Zarqawi → AQI mythological lineage. The tripartite title "scholars, commanders, and soldiers" (علماء وقادة وجنودا) elevates them to a heroic trinity. This is notable in an AQAP publication: it deliberately blurs the AQAP–AQI–ISIS organizational lineage into a unified "global jihad" narrative.

4. "Minister of War" — state-building echo

• Calling Abu Hamza al-Muhajir "the Minister of War" (وزير الحرب) is a quasi-state title. This echoes the AQI "Islamic State in Iraq" self-designation and the later ISIS caliphate rhetoric. In an AQAP text, it's a subtle but significant state-building signal — it implies that the jihadist project is not merely resistance but governance-in-waiting.

5. The 9/11 ↔ FZ1073 parallel — the central rhetorical engine

• The core move is: "the same scene repeats itself, in the same manner" (يتكرر نفس المشهد بنفس الطريقة). The FZ1073 attempt is not presented as an isolated incident but as a spiritual continuation of 9/11. The critical twist is the locative: "but in the heart of the Islamic world" (في قلب العالم الإسلامي). The UAE is a Muslim-majority state, so the attack is reframed as an internal Muslim act of resistance, not an external one. This is a significant rhetorical escalation.

6. "Zionist-UAE" (صهيوإماراتية) — a neologism of de-legitimization

• This is the most novel element in the text. By fusing "Zionist" (صهيوني) and "UAE" (إماراتي) into a single compound adjective, the text collapses the distinction between Israel and the UAE, framing the Gulf state as an organ of the Zionist entity. This is a major escalation in AQAP's rhetoric toward Gulf states — the UAE is no longer a "crusader" ally but a Zionist actor. It implicitly extends the target list beyond Israel and the US to include the UAE's aviation, infrastructure, and population.

7. US withdrawal from Iraq as divine vindication

• The text links the FZ1073 attempt (30 Sept) with the US withdrawal from Iraq (also 30 Sept, on that day the last US forces left Erbil Air Base) and frames both as evidence that "the goal of breaking the spine of Islam" failed.
• "Humiliating withdrawal" (الانسحاب الذليل) + "praise be to God" (ولله الحمد) is the Azzam/Qutb "divine promise" framework: God promised victory, and these events are its fulfillment. The coincidence of dates is not accidental in the text's logic — it is proof.

8. Implicit call for action
While this section is narrative rather than directive, the framing is a veiled invitation to imitate:

• "It nearly caused an event that could have shifted the balance" — the attack almost succeeded and could change the region, implying it should be retried.
• The hagiographic treatment of the attacker (implied, made explicit in the other parts per press coverage) positions him as a model.
• The "same scene, same manner" framing normalizes the attack type (airliner hijacking) as a legitimate, even obligatory, continuation of 9/11.

(II) palsta
Giving Permission
Part 2 | **Operational permission** | "They can be targeted"; "non-believer" argument; Iraq ↔ Gaza parallel

After the Americans and their allies from the sects of disbelief and the Rafidi Safavids occupied Iraq, the people [of Iraq] and many of the scholars were filled with despair, believing that [the occupiers] could not be defeated and that there was no benefit in Jihad and that the resistance against them was futile. Then Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his brothers rose up to confront them then, supported by the Sheikhs of Jihad within Al-Qaeda and other heroes and this was the beginning of the end — which proved to be a source of solace for the hearts of Muslims [lit. "chilling blow to the chests of Muslims" (this idionym has a positive connotation in Arabic)] and a source of distress for the enemies of the faith/religion.

America was broken in Iraq at the hands of Sunni mujahideen of Al-Qaeda and other honorable fighters,and the Zionists were broken in Gaza at the hands of the heroic mujahideen of the Al-Qassam Brigades and their honorable allies.

They are the twin heads of evil in the world [...these two represent the pinnacle of evil in the world]: the first is the "world's policeman", and the second is his beloved/darling [pampered] offspring [child/son]. The war is far from over [and has not ended yet]; Aircraft carrying the Zionists, Americans and the rest of the crusader sects of disbelief at war with Islam still continue to circle in the skies, and they can be targeted as happened on (9/11) and (30/9).

And even if no operation is carried out by a believer ["man zealous for his religion"] motivated by elevating the word of god — [given that] America and the Zionists have far more enemies today than they had before — perhaps a man who doesn't believe in god or the afterlife will target them, and his operation will still ultimately serve the interests of Islam and Muslims [benefit Islam, fall in the interest of Islam and the Muslims] — just as the prophet of Islam foretold/has said:

1. The despair → Zarqawi narrative: a founding myth

• The opening constructs a soteriological arc: despair (إحباط) → intervention → victory. This is the AQI founding myth told from the AQAP perspective. Zarqawi is not presented as a controversial or divisive figure (as he was within the broader jihadist movement) but as the sole agent who broke the paralysis. The phrase "beginning of the end" (بداية النهاية) is a Qutbian eschatological marker — it implies the end of the American project was already sealed at that moment. This is a deliberate rehabilitation of Zarqawi's legacy, which is significant because Zarqawi was historically the most contested figure in the jihadist movement (rejected by al-Qaeda's central leadership, associated with the sectarian civil war in Iraq). In AQAP's framing, he is simply "one of the heroes."

2. "Rafidi Shia" — the sectarian axis
The phrase ملل الكفر والرافضة الصفوية (sects of disbelief and the Safavid Rafidi) is doing double duty:

• It excludes Shia from the ummah (Rafidi = a derogatory Sunni term for Twelver Shia; "Safavid" invokes the Persian imperial origin of the label).
• It collapses the US occupation and the Shia militias into a single enemy, which is the AQI/AQAP sectarian framing that distinguishes them from the more "global" jihadist line. This is a key AQAP-specific marker: they are not purely "global jihadists" — they are Sunni-purist global jihadists who see the Shia as part of the crusader-Zionist axis.

3. The Iraq ↔ Gaza parallel: unified victory narrative
The parallel structure is the central rhetorical engine of Part 2:

• Iraq: America "broken" by Sunni mujahideen (al-Qaeda) and other honorable men
• Gaza: Zionists "broken" by Al-Qassam (Hamas) mujahideen and other honorable men

This is a major escalation in AQAP's rhetoric. AQAP has historically been skeptical of Hamas's "nationalist" framing and its cooperation with Iran (a Shia state). By placing Hamas's al-Qassam brigades on the same plane as al-Qaeda's Sunni mujahideen — both "broken" their respective enemies — AQAP is:

• Legitimizing Hamas as a jihadist actor (not just a nationalist one).
• Creating a unified "global jihad victory" narrative that spans the Sunni-Shia divide on the battlefield while maintaining the sectarian divide in the enemy camp (US + Shia = one axis; Sunni + Hamas = another).
• This is a novel strategic framing: it's not "all Muslims are united" but "the fighters are united against the crusader-Zionist-Shia axis."

4. "World's police" and "beloved son" — the Azzam binary, updated
The US is the world's police (شرطي العالم) and Israel is its beloved son (الابن المدلل). This is a direct echo of Azzam's framing of the US as the "head of the infidel coalition" and Israel as its "vanguard," but updated with a familial metaphor (father/son) that implies:

• A hierarchy of evil: the US is the primary target (the "head of evil"), Israel is the secondary (the "son").
• But both are indivisible — attacking either is attacking the whole.
• The familial metaphor also implies that killing the son is a legitimate way to weaken the father, which is the implicit logic behind the FZ1073 attack (attacking a UAE/Israeli-linked plane to weaken the US-Israel axis).

5. The explicit call for action — the most dangerous passage

بإمكان استهدافها — "they can be targeted"

This is the first direct, imperative call for action in the text so far. It is not a narrative or a hagiography — it is a threat vector identification paired with a permission structure:

• Target: planes carrying Zionists, Americans, and "crusader sects of disbelief" (ملل الكفر المحارية للإسلام).
• Method: as happened on 9/11 and 30/9 (i.e., airliner hijacking/attack).
• Precedent: two named dates, establishing a pattern that is presented as repeatable.

This is the Azzam "defend the ummah" imperative operationalized: the planes are still flying, the threat is still active, therefore the response is still obligatory. The "war has not ended" (لم تنته الحرب بعد) framing makes inaction impossible — to do nothing is to be complicit in the ongoing "war against Islam."

6. The "non-believer" framing — a radicalization escalation

فلربما يستهدفها رجل لا يؤمن بالله ولا باليوم الآخر وستصب عمليته في صالح الإسلام والمسلمين

"Perhaps a man who does not believe in God or the Last Day will target them, and his operation will fall in the interest of Islam and the Muslims."

This is the most radical and novel element in the entire text so far. It does several things simultaneously:

• Universalizes the actor: the operation does not require faith. This is a de-sacralization of the attack — it becomes a strategic act, not a spiritual one. The threshold for "who can do this" is lowered to anyone, including non-Muslims, atheists, and anti-American actors.
• Paradoxically expands the threat: by saying "even a non-believer's attack would benefit Islam," the text implies that any anti-American or anti-Israeli attack, regardless of motive, is a jihadist success. This is a radicalization of the audience: it tells the reader that the "war" is so total that even secular actors are unwittingly fighting for Islam.
• Psychological effect on the reader: it removes the moral burden of the attack. If even an atheist's attack counts, then the "moral" justification is no longer the primary driver — the strategic one is. This is a Qutbian move: the outcome (victory of Islam) matters more than the intention (niyyah), which is a controversial theological position that AQAP is using to broaden the pool of potential actors.
• Implicit threat: it tells the reader that the next attack might not even be by a "mujahid" — it could be by anyone, for any reason. This is a psychological warfare element: it makes the threat unpredictable and inescapable.

7. The hadith reference (cut off)
The text ends with كما قال النبي ("as the Prophet said"), introducing a hadith that is cut off. The hadith is the theological anchor for the "non-believer" argument. Without it, the claim that an atheist's attack "benefits Islam" is theologically untenable in mainstream Sunni Islam. The hadith is being used to retroactively justify the de-sacralization of the attack.

8. Radicalization pattern summary (Pattern | Source | Function in text)
Sacred calendar / cyclical history | Qutb | 9/11 and 30/9 as divine pivots
Despair → savior narrative | AQI founding myth | Zarqawi as the one who broke paralysis
Binary world (Islam vs. rest) | Qutb / Azzam | US + Israel + Shia = one axis
"Defend the ummah" imperative | Azzam | Planes still flying → action still required
Direct call for action | Azzam / operational | "They can be targeted"
De-sacralization of the actor | Novel / Qutbian | Even a non-believer's attack counts
Unified victory narrative (Iraq + Gaza) | Novel / strategic | Legitimizes Hamas; creates "global jihad" success story
Sectarian exclusion (Rafidi) | AQAP-specific | Distinguishes AQAP from "pure" global jihad
Hadith as theological anchor | Classical | Justifies the "non-believer" argument

9. What's novel / central in this part

• The explicit call for action ("they can be targeted") — the text moves from narrative to operational permission.
• The "non-believer" framing — the most radical element; de-sacralizes the attack and universalizes the actor.
• The Iraq ↔ Gaza parallel — a strategic legitimization of Hamas that is novel in AQAP's rhetoric.
• The "world's police / beloved son" familial metaphor — an updated Azzam binary with a clear hierarchy of targets.
• The hadith reference (cut off) — the theological linchpin for the "non-believer" argument; critical to the full narrative.

(III) palsta
Making a Promise
Part 3 | **Theological anchor + explicit threat** | Hadith repurposing; "ten times 9/11" promise; "House of Saud" call; social media instruction

[hadith jatkuu edelliseltä palstalta] ... may allah's peace and blessings be upon him: "Indeed allah will support this religion through people who have no share [in the Hereafter]" (لا خلاق لهم) [i.e. allah is supporting the religion through (wicked) people of no morals]. Al-Qaeda has threatened years ago that it is preparing for operations that exceed 9/11 by tenfold [ten times greater than 9/11, would surpass 9/11 by tenfold] — and that is not difficult for allah: The day will come when the Empire of Evil, [i.e.] America, meets its end, and we will cleanse/purge Al-Aqsa Mosque of the filth of the Jews, and the Two Holy Mosques of the tampering/meddling of the House of Saud.

Congratulations to you, O heroic mujahideen of the Islamic faith in Iraq, the Levant (Sham), Afghanistan, Somalia, the African Sahel, the Arabian Peninsula and other battlefields — for today you are writing the glory of the Ummah with your blood, and you shall find your reward with allah in full. And whoever is still alive to see it, will reap the fruits of the jihad waged by the brethren who came before him — a victory that is now within close reach [lit. "a bowshot away or even nearer" (قاب قوسين أو أدنى)].

It is truly wonderful to see the supporting brothers on social media platforms republishing the statements and operations of our heroes in the Land of the Two Rivers, as well as the words of the Sheikhs of Jihad from the era of the American occupation of Iraq — such as the words of the two imams, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri and the commander of the suicide operations Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and others. Their words [truly] serve as a testament [are a proof] for the Ummah — standing in contrast to the "scholars of submission/prostration/capitulation" who abandoned them — and act as a beacon of hope, encouraging/inspiring the mujahideen to continue their sacrifices and press onward with their journey until allah perfects/completes his light and exalts his word upon the earth.

1. The hadith — theological linchpin of the "non-believer" argument
The hadith completed from Part 2 is: "إن الله سيؤيد هذا الدين بأقوام لا خلاق لهم" — "God will support this religion through people who have no share [in the Hereafter]" (reported in Tirmidhi, Musnad Ahmad 20454 and others; cf. Sahih al-Bukhari 3062, 4203 and Sahih Muslim 111). The classical interpretation refers to poor, destitute, or socially insignificant believers — those with no wealth, no tribe, no political power — whom God elevates through their faith.

AQAP's use here is a deliberate theological repurposing: the "people with no standing" are not the poor believers of the classical reading but the FZ1073 co-pilot — an individual with no organizational backing, no training, no network, acting alone. The hadith is being stretched to mean: anyone, regardless of status, faith, or affiliation, can be the instrument of God's support for Islam. This is the theological anchor for Part 2's radical claim that "even a non-believer's operation benefits Islam." The hadith provides the prophetic authority that makes the de-sacralization of the actor seem not merely strategic but divinely ordained.

This is a significant theological innovation (bid'ah) within the jihadist movement: the hadith has never been used in this way in classical or contemporary jihadist literature. It is a novel hermeneutic move that broadens the "who can fight" question to its absolute limit.

2. The "ten times 9/11" threat — a direct operational callback

وقد هددت القاعدة من قبل سنوات أنها تعد لعمليات تفوق 11 سبتمبر بعشرة أضعاف

This is a direct reference to al-Qaeda's long-standing public pledge — made in multiple communications over the years — to carry out an operation "far exceeding 9/11." The Lawfare Media article confirms that al-Qaeda leadership (including al-Qaeda senior member Abu Muhammad al-Masri) has publicly asserted that "the effect of these large-scale operations would far exceed the 9/11 attacks." The "ten times" multiplier is a specific escalation that appears in earlier al-Qaeda propaganda. By invoking this prior threat in the context of the FZ1073 incident, AQAP is doing two things:

• Legitimizing the FZ1073 attempt as the beginning of the fulfillment of a long-standing pledge — the co-pilot's act is not a random incident but the first step toward a much larger operation.
• Implicitly threatening that the "ten times 9/11" operation is still in the pipeline. The phrase "that is not difficult for God" (وما ذلك على الله بعزيز) is a theological guarantee that the operation will happen — it is not a matter of capability but of divine will.

This is the most explicit operational threat in the entire three-part text. It moves from "they can be targeted" (Part 2, permission) to "we will do it, and it will be ten times worse" (Part 3, promise).

3. "Purge Al-Aqsa" and "the two holy mosques from the meddling of the House of Saud"

This is the most politically explosive passage in the text:

سنطهر المسجد الأقصى من رجس اليهود والحرمين من عبث آل سعود

"We will purge Al-Aqsa of the filth of the Jews and the two holy mosques from the meddling of the House of Saud."

This is a direct, explicit call for the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy (آل سعود = the House of Saud). For an AQAP publication — a group based in Yemen, a Saudi neighbor, with a long history of operating in Saudi territory (the 2000s Saudi jihad, the 2005 Riyadh bombings, the 2012 Khamis Mushait bombing) — this is not a new claim. But its placement here is significant:

• It is paired with the Al-Aqsa liberation goal, creating a dual eschatological promise: the end of the "empire of evil" (US) is simultaneously the liberation of Al-Aqsa and the removal of the Saudi ruling family from the two holy mosques.
• The word عبث ("meddling" / "fussing") is a deliberate de-legitimization of Saudi custodianship of Mecca and Medina. It implies that the Saudis are not legitimate guardians but interlopers who have "meddled" with what belongs to the ummah.
• The word رجس ("filth" / "abomination") for the Jews at Al-Aqsa is a dehumanizing term with deep roots in jihadist rhetoric (echoing the Quranic use of رجس for idolatry and corruption).

This is a novel escalation in the sense that AQAP is now explicitly linking the Gulf states (UAE in Part 1, Saudi Arabia here) to the Zionist axis in a single theological-geopolitical framework. The "Zionist-UAE" neologism from Part 1 and the "House of Saud" call here together constitute a comprehensive de-legitimization of the Gulf order.

4. The comprehensive battlefield list — AQAP's global map

العراق والشام وافغانستان والصومال والساحل الأفريقي وجزيرة العرب وغيرها من الساحات

"Iraq, Sham, Afghanistan, Somalia, the African Sahel, and the Arabian Peninsula, and other battlefields"

This is a complete enumeration of the jihadist operational theaters as of 2026. It is significant because:

• Sham (Syria) is included, which is notable given the post-Assad power vacuum and the complex situation in Syria. AQAP is claiming the Syrian theater as part of the "global jihad" narrative.
• The Arabian Peninsula is explicitly named, which is a direct reference to Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the UAE — all of which are now framed as battlefields rather than sovereign states.
• The phrase "and other battlefields" (وغيرها من الساحات) is an open-ended invitation: the list is not exhaustive, and new theaters can be added at any time.

This is the Azzam "global jihad" map updated for 2026. It is a strategic claim of relevance: AQAP is asserting that it is the ideological center of all these theaters, not just a Yemeni or Arabian Peninsula group.

5. "A bowshot away" — the eschatological countdown

وهو قاب قوسين أو أدنى

This is a Quranic phrase (53:5, 53:9; can even mean "the distance between the bow's string and its wood center") originally referring to the proximity of the dead in the grave to God's judgment. Here it is used to mean: victory is imminent, a bowshot away or even nearer. This is a Qutbian eschatological marker — it implies that the "end of the empire of evil" is not a distant goal but an imminent event. The phrase creates a psychological urgency in the reader: the moment of triumph is now, and inaction is a failure to participate in it.

6. The social media call — a novel operational dimension

وكم هو جميل أن يقوم الإخوة المناصرون عبر شبكات التواصل الاجتماعي بإعادة نشر كلمات وعمليات أبطالنا

"How beautiful it is that the brother supporters through social media networks re-publish the words and operations of our heroes…"

This is a direct instruction for digital propagation. It is a novel operational element in AQAP's rhetoric:

• It legitimizes social media as a tool of jihad, not merely a communication channel but a theatrical space where the "glory of the ummah" is written.
• It names specific content to be re-published: the words of bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Zarqawi from the Iraq occupation period. This is a digital hagiography instruction: the reader is told to actively circulate the words of the dead leaders as a proof (حجة) for the ummah.
• The phrase "their words are a proof for the ummah" (كلماتهم حجة للأمة) is a theological claim: the words of bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Zarqawi are being elevated to the status of a normative authority (حجة = a binding proof/evidence in Islamic jurisprudence). This is a significant theological escalation — it places their words on a par with prophetic or scholarly authority.
• The phrase "key to hope" (مفتاح أمل) is a psychological recruitment tool: it tells the reader that re-publishing this content is not merely propaganda but an act of faith that sustains the movement.

This is a digital radicalization pipeline: the text is not just a message but a set of instructions for the reader to become an active node in the propagation network. It transforms the reader from a passive consumer into an active participant in the "jihad of the word."

7. "The two imams" — bin Laden and Zawahiri as religious authority

ككلمات الإمامين: أسامة بن لادن وأيمن الظواهري

Calling bin Laden and Zawahiri "the two imams" (الإمامين) is a theological elevation that is both a continuation of the jihadist tradition and a novel intensification:

• In classical Islamic usage, "imam" refers to a leader of prayer, a scholar, or a caliph. Applying it to bin Laden and Zawahiri is a claim of religious authority that goes beyond mere political leadership.
• The use of the definite article (الإمامين = "the two imams") implies that they are the imams — the only legitimate ones — and that all other Muslim leaders (including the "scholars of submission" mentioned in the next phrase) are illegitimate.
• This is paired with the phrase "من خذلهم من علماء الانبطاح" ("those who abandoned them among the scholars of submission/prostration"), which is a direct attack on mainstream Sunni scholars who have rejected the jihadist project. The term الانبطاح ("submission" / "prostration" / "crawling") is a dehumanizing term that implies physical and spiritual degradation.

8. Radicalization pattern summary — Part 3 (Pattern | Source | Function)
Hadith repurposing (la khalal lahum) | Novel / Qutbian | Theological anchor for "anyone can fight"
"Ten times 9/11" threat | AQ central / operational | Explicit operational promise; escalation from permission to threat
"Purge Al-Aqsa" / "House of Saud" | AQAP-specific / sectarian | Direct call for Saudi overthrow; Gulf de-legitimization
Comprehensive battlefield list | Azzam / global jihad | Strategic claim of relevance; open-ended expansion
"A bowshot away" | Quranic / eschatological | Urgency; victory is imminent
Social media propagation instruction | Novel / digital | Reader as active node; digital hagiography pipeline
"The two imams" (bin Laden / Zawahiri) | Theological escalation | Religious authority claim; mainstream scholars as "scholars of submission"

9. What's novel / central in Part 3

• The hadith repurposing — the most significant theological innovation in the entire text; it provides the prophetic authority for the "non-believer" argument and the de-sacralization of the actor.
• The "ten times 9/11" explicit threat — the most dangerous operational element; it moves from narrative to promise.
• The "House of Saud" call — the most politically explosive element; a direct call for the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy, paired with the Al-Aqsa liberation goal.
• The social media instruction — the most novel operational element; it transforms the reader into an active propagandist and elevates bin Laden/Zawahiri/Zarqawi to the status of "imams" whose words are a "proof for the ummah."
• The "scholars of submission" attack — a direct, personal attack on mainstream Sunni scholars who have rejected the jihadist project; it is a sectarian exclusion that mirrors the "Rafidi" exclusion from Part 2 but targets the Sunni establishment rather than the Shia.

[zzrgg]

Ketjussa aiemmin mainitussa Corriere della Seran artikkelissa esitetty huomio hätävalojen syttymisestä ja päälläolosta lennon FZ1073 aikana on herättänyt kommentteja lentomatkailun ammattilaisten keskuudessa ympäri maailmaa. Eläköityneen American Airlines lentokapteenin Steve Scheibnerin (Captain Steeeve) mukaan hätävalot voivat olla päällä lennon aikana neljästä eri syystä:

1. Hätävalot voidaan sytyttää manuaalisesti ohjaamossa sijaitsevalla nappulalla.
2. Molemmat generaattorin ohjauskytkimet on kytketty pois päältä, jolloin hätävalot syttyvät.
3. Molemmat lentokoneen moottorit ovat sammuneet (vähentyneen ilmavirran vuoksi esimerkiksi "aerodynaamisen sivuluisuputoamisen" aikana, ks. ao. video 7:40-10:55), ja tuossa tapauksessa hätävalot syttyvät.
4. Polttoaineen syötön katkaiseminen molemmille moottoreille manuaalisesti molemmista polttoaineen syötön kytkimistä sytyttäisi myös hätävalot. Tuolloin generaattorit eivät enää olisi tuottaneet lentokoneelle sähköä, ja akkuvirta olisi kytkeytynyt päälle, koska 737 MAX:ssa ei ole ilmavirran avulla toimivaa hätägeneraattoria (RAT).

Tuossa viimeisessä skenaariossa konetta tuolloin ohjanneen pilotin olisi pitänyt tehdä melko yksinkertainen toimenpide moottorien käynnistämiseksi, eli kääntää molemmat polttoaineen syötön kytkimet "cut off" -tilasta "run" -asentoon. Tämä avaa polttoaineventtiilit sekä aloittaa automaattisesti käynnistyssekvenssin (kipinän tuottamisen), jos turbiinit vain pyörivät vinhasti ja melko lailla samaan tahtiin kyseisenä hetkenä. Keskeistä lentoa FZ1073 tuossa vaiheessa ohjanneille piloteille olisi ollut havaita moottorien tila, äänestä tai mittaristosta, mutta ex-kapteeni Scheibnerin mukaan kyseinen skenaario ja sen vaatimat toimenpiteet kuuluvat siviililentokoulutuksen perusmateriaaliin.

Hauska on myös Scheibnerin vertaus al-Hammaista kiitospäivän kalkkunaan (ao. videon loppupuolella):

Co-pilot asked the passengers and the crew to kill him. They did not. They had, however, tied him up like a Thanksgiving turkey, right, with flex cuffs and wires they had in the back of the airplane so that he would be doing no harm to anybody.