Turkki on Syyrian sisällissodan puhjettua ollut oppositiovoimien puolella, sillä se haluaa al-Assadin alaviittihallinnon kaatuvan. Samalla Turkki haluaa ehdottomasti estää kurdijoukkojen ja kielletyn Kurdistanin työväenpuolueen (PKK) vahvistumisen. Eli vaikka se on sallinut pienen joukon irakilaisia kurdeja ylittää rajan Syyriaan, se ei halua, että rajan tuntumaan alkaisi virrata turkkilaisia PKK:n kurditaistelijoita, jotka 2013 tulitaukosopimuksen jälkeen vetäytyivät Irakin vuoristoihin. PKK on muuten alunperin marxilais-leninistinen nationalistinen ryhmä, joka on kylläkin kääntynyt kohti modernimpaa liberaalia sosialismia.marokon_kauhu kirjoitti:Mitenköhän on muuten mahdollista että Turkin puolustusvoimat estävät Kurdien pääsyn Kobanesta Turkin puolelle ja estävät Kurditaistelijoiden menon auttamaan sinne Turkin puolelta (no, olivat jonkun uutisen mukaan päästäneet pienen joukon), mutta Euroopan ISIS vapaaehtoisia sinne kyllä Turkista virta jatkuvasti?
Aiemmin Turkin käsiä sitoi vielä se, että ISIS oli kidnapannut 49 turkkilaista diplomaattia ja näiden perheitä. Nyttemmin nämä on vapautettu (voi vain kuvitella, mitä Turkki tällöin lupasi ISIS:lle...), joten tilanne on vähän muuttunut.
Tässä Turkin asemaa selitetään englanniksi:
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n21/patrick-co ... -turkey-onPatrick Cockburn kirjoitti:And then there was the Turkish problem. US planes attacking Isis forces in Kobani had to fly 1200 miles from their bases in the Gulf because Turkey wouldn’t allow the use of its airbase at Incirlik, just a hundred miles from Kobani. By not preventing reinforcements, weapons and ammunition from reaching Isis in Kobani, Ankara was showing that it would prefer Isis to hold the town: anything was better than the PYD. Turkey’s position had been clear since July 2012, when the Syrian army, under pressure from rebels elsewhere, pulled out of the main Kurdish areas. The Syrian Kurds, long persecuted by Damascus and politically marginal, suddenly won de facto autonomy under increasing PKK authority. Living mostly along the border with Turkey, a strategically important area to Isis, the Kurds unexpectedly became players in the struggle for power in a disintegrating Syria. This was an unwelcome development for the Turks. The dominant political and military organisations of the Syrian Kurds were branches of the PKK and obeyed instructions from Ocalan and the military leadership in Qandil. The PKK insurgents, who had fought for so long for some form of self-rule in Turkey, now ruled a quasi-state in Syria centred on the cities of Qamishli, Kobani and Afrin. Much of the Syrian border region was likely to remain in Kurdish hands, since the Syrian government and its opponents were both too weak to do anything about it. Ankara may not be the master chess player collaborating with Isis to break Kurdish power, as conspiracy theorists believe, but it saw the advantage to itself of allowing Isis to weaken the Syrian Kurds. It was never a very far-sighted policy: if Isis succeeded in taking Kobani, and thus humiliating the US, the Americans’ supposed ally Turkey would be seen as partly responsible, after sealing off the town. In the event, the Turkish change of course was embarrassingly speedy. Within hours of Erdoğan saying that Turkey wouldn’t help the PYD terrorists, permission was being given for Iraqi Kurds to reinforce the PYD fighters at Kobani.
Tuo artikkeli on muutenkin mielenkiintoinen. Siinä kerrotaan hiukan myös siitä, miksi ISIS:iä suvaitaan sunnien keskuudessa niin hyvin:
Tuo vyyhti on kyllä äärimmäisen monimutkainen...[T]he main fighting forces facing Isis are the Shia militias. Highly sectarian and often criminalised, they are fighting hard around Baghdad to drive back Isis and cleanse mixed areas of the Sunni population. Sunnis are often picked up at checkpoints, held for ransoms of tens of thousands of dollars and usually murdered even when the money is paid. Amnesty International says that the militias, including the Badr Brigade and Asaib Ahl al Haq, operate with total immunity; it has accused the Shia-dominated government of ‘sanctioning war crimes’. With the Iraqi government and the US paying out big sums of money to businessmen, tribal leaders and anybody else who says they will fight Isis, local warlords are on the rise again: between twenty and thirty new militias have been created since June. This means that Iraqi Sunnis have no choice but to stick with Isis. The only alternative is the return of ferocious Shia militiamen who suspect all Sunnis of supporting the Islamic State. Having barely recovered from the last war, Iraq is being wrecked by a new one.
Turkissa muuten vaihtui pääministeri elokuussa. Erdogan on nyt presidentti ja Ahmet Davutoğlusta tuli pääministeri. Miehet edustavat samaa AKP-puoluetta.marokon_kauhu kirjoitti:Turkin pääministeri ainakin taitaa todellisuudessa olla kovan linjan islamisti,
ja sympatiat sielläkin ISIS tappajien puolella.
