Pelipaikoille pääsemättä on tuo Meyer kyllä tehnyt aikamoista vertailevaa tutkimusta näistä vahtimatruusi Silverin seitsemästä lausunnosta. Ai että kun on makiaa.
Summary of the seven Statements of Silver Linde
a.) Noise heard on car deck:
ca. 00.45, 00.45, 00.35, 00.35/00.40, 00.40, ca. 00.45 and 00.50-00.55;
at first he spoke about an unusual metal/metal noise; then about a crash behind the ramp, then at the hearing by JAIC on 17.10.94 and on 17.11.94 he explained the noise to have been just slightly louder than the normal ones created by wave impact respectively that he could hear the noise only because he was just 1.5 m away from the ramp and he would not have heard it if he would have been 10-20 m away; at the Landvetter hearing on 31.03.95 it became a beating (not a scraping) noise and, finally, in his last testimony on 25.01.96 - the noise was remarkable and not typical for ship/wave contact and he had never heard it before or thereafter, which is actually in agreement with what 3rd engineer Margus Treu had said from the beginning, although had always mentioned at least 2 extraordinary bangs not caused by wave impact.
In summary it has to be concluded that
Silver Linde is the only one just reporting one noise - bang - crash;
there had most likely been something at about 00.45 hours and that he subsequently changed the time according to the requirements of his principals which becomes very obvious in his last statements when he puts the time at 00.50/00.55 hours because at that time JAIC had already decided to keep the time between the first notification to the bridge and the very late Mayday as short as possible;
the whole story about his observations on the car deck at this time is fabricated anyway, because at this time several crew members had been working hectically on the car deck for some time already, including the boatswain Vello Ruben, and were trying to hold the visor and the bow ramp.
b.) Action thereafter:
in all statements he reported to the watch officer, which he certainly did at some time before the heel (testimony Margus Treu, Paula Liikaama/ Ervin Roden), but he never mentioned the water on the car deck which Margus Treu and Ervin Roden heard him reporting;
in his first statement on 29.09.94 and in his 4th statement on 17.11.94 he did not mention that he checked the control lights, in the following one - on 03.12.94 - he said that the controls for the bow ramp could only be operated by a special key which was in the possession of the boatswain, (the controls are in the same box as the control lights which should have been locked), thus it has to be assumed that he could not check the control lights. In all the other statements he said that he did so.
c.) Back to bridge and persons met on the bridge:
ca. 00.58, 01.00, 01.00, 01.00, 01.00, ca. 01.00, ca. 01.00 - thus at ca. 01.00 hours he was back on the bridge.
officers relieved each other, master came to the bridge;
officers not mentioned - master on the bridge;
new officers on the bridge - the previous officers had left already, master came a bit later;
previous and new officers on the bridge, master not mentioned;
officers had changed watch; master not mentioned;
previous officers had left, new officers had taken over, master was on the bridge;
officers had just changed watch, master entered the bridge just before him.
The above variations cover practically all thinkable possibilities apart from one, viz. that there was nobody on the bridge. It has to be concluded that Linde is not telling the truth.
d.) After having left the bridge:
in his first and last statements he helped an elderly couple;
in the 5 statements in between he did not mention this. Since he said in his first statement that the situation eased somewhat when the vessel rolled back to port, it has to be assumed that it was immediately, i.e. ca. 1 minute, before the big heel which is in agreement with other evidence.
e.) At the Information desk
in all his statements - except for the 2nd and the 3rd - he explained sometimes very detailed, sometimes less detailed, that he went to the Information desk (deck 5) to ask for the unlocking of the car deck doors when suddenly the vessel heeled very severely to starboard;
in his 2nd statement he did not mention, if at all and in his 3rd one, he said that he was sent down from the bridge to the information, to inform them about the alarm.
Since the car deck doors were never locked at sea according to purser Andres Vihmar and many truck drivers, although it was announced over the loudspeakers after departure that they were, it has to be assumed that he was actually sent down from the bridge to tell the Information girl to alarm the passengers (several minutes before the big heel !).
f.) Further action:
continued to deck 4, met panic stricken people, rushed up to deck 7, fell down inside before he could reach the outer deck, reported to the bridge that deck 1 was under water;
up to deck 7 and distributed lifevests;
could not go below deck 4, went up to deck 7, where people told him about water on deck 1;
down to deck 4 where he met plenty of people, went up to deck 7 together with them, informed the bridge about water on deck 1 which surprised them, heel over 30°;
the same again;
to deck 4 and then to deck 7 from where he reported to the bridge about water on deck 1, reached the outside of deck 7 and fell down when he was called from the bridge and instructed to go down to deck 1 and check, lost his walkie-talkie, with him were Aulis Lee and Aldo Metspalu, heel over 30°;
when the vessel was on the side and the stern was sinking, he went into the water and finally got into a liferaft, the time was then 01.24 hours on his wristwatch.
g.) The finale:
visor missing and vessel sank stern first, it took about 1 hour from the big heel to vessel's sinking;
bow was up and down and the bow ramp was in position;
visor was gone but the ramp was in place, saw the ramp flaps;
the starboard lifeboats were in the water but could not be used;
heard all the alarms including "Mr. Skylight to No. 1 and 2" when he was already on the outer deck 7 distributing lifevests; left the vessel when the heel was 90° or more, looked at his watch when he was in the liferaft and it was 01.24 hours;
looked at his watch at 01.24 hours when he was already in the liferaft, visor was gone but bow ramp in place but slightly open.
