Girkin sanoo, että Ukrainalla on mahdollisuus murtautua Zaporizhzhian puolustuksen läpi, koska venäjällä ei ole varusteltuja ja koulutettuja reservejä.
Muistutetaan vielä että Girkin oli myöskin täysin oikeassa Bakhmutista, että sen valtaus ei johda mihinkään ryssän läpimurtoon rintamalla mitä ryssätrollit hokivat. Joku Odessan valtaus on aivan täyttä utopiaa mihin tuskin enää suurin osa ryssistäkään uskoo, vaikka täällä eräällä usko on kova.
Jo pelkästään ryssän logistiikka- ja huolto-ongelmat takaavat sen ettei mitään ryssän suurhyökkäystä enää tule, saati että se pääsisi enää Dnieperin yli Hersoniin ja siitä Odessaan. Ei tule tapahtumaan.
"The summer battle continues where the enemy is now not trying to break through but push through our frontline and “starve it out”.
The enemy continues applying main efforts in the Zaporizhzhia frontline, and the second area where he is transferring reserves, including those previously unused, is Bakhmut. The enemy is trying to achieve a result wherever possible, without abandoning the plans to break the Zaporizhzhia front.
After failures of attacks using concentrated columns, since columns like that ended up vulnerable to our artillery and aviation, the enemy moved to the tactic of a complete mixing with the ground of our units facing him. The enemy has a lot of shells, he’s not counting high-precision missiles.
Due to this, the enemy is trying to destroy, and completely knock out the units facing him in battle. The enemy is trying to avoid mass attacks as he made sure that breakthrough doesn’t depend on the number of vehicles, whether 4 or 40, thrown into battle, only the number of burned vehicles does.
Thus, offensive actions are led by fairly small assault groups with the support of several armoured vehicles, and all weapon systems used to destroy them are located by all types of enemy reconnaissances and then struck with artillery and high-precision missiles.
[…]
The enemy has the ability to withdraw weathered formations for rest and bring up fresh ones to continue the battle. But we have the same units fighting on the front - yes, they fight in defence, but the commanders who are continuously taking part in combat don’t feel much better from this.
It is a similar situation that led to the dismissal of the commander of the 58th Army, General Popov, who put forward an issue that existing personnel and equipment are not enough to carry out the rotation and give the troops at least some semblance of rest. And there are no reserves to bring them to a fully capable state.
[...]
I will not be revealing a military secret - the enemy knows the situation very well, unfortunately. But even in the secondary directions, the staffing of our forces again does not exceed 70%. In areas of the most fierce battles, it is significantly less.
Of course, it does not compare to the situation at the end of last summer/early autumn, when 20% staffing of units was considered normal, but our forces are taking losses continuously, while the stream of reinforcements and reservists from the rear has died down.
This means that if urgent measures are not taken, the enemy, unfortunately, has a chance to gnaw through our defence in Zaporizhzhia. And it will be then very difficult to stop him, and no Surovikin’s line which is still in a pretty deep rear will stop the enemy if it’s not taken by trained, properly equipped, and experienced troops.
If these troops die in the field, there will be no one to stop the enemy. This is the main question now: will the enemy be able to gnaw through our defence in 2-3 weeks, exchanging his soldiers for ours, or not, and will exhaust himself earlier.
[…]
We’re observing. Unfortuantely, we as the Angry Patriots’ Club are unable to do anything in this situation. Moreover, I understand the emotions of our Head of General Staff, the commander of the operation Gerasimov, when “some” army commander makes demands about the rotation of units.
Gerasimov does not have prepared and equipped reserves. Simply does not. All he has is already on the frontline, at the very least in tactical reserves. Transferring from other areas means weakening them. But transferring poorly trained mobilised units who are, let’s say, covering the “old regions” of Russia, is not a solution. These units have no experience, no vehicles, no good commanders, they will be simply smashed by the enemy and no one will be able to do anything about it.""
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